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ABSTRACT
Governments provide public information about economic conditions to re-
duce information imperfections and facilitate e±cient allocation of resources.
Do households in developing countries rely on public signals to inform them-
selves about market conditions? To identify the importance of public informa-
tion in households' price expectations, we take advantage of a unique natural
experiment in Ecuador where the published in°ation rate had been di®erent
from the true rate over a period of 14 months due to a software error. We ¯nd
that the public signal about prices plays an important role in households' price
expectations; the e®ect is stronger for better educated families, older people
and men.
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Governments provide public information about market conditions in part to reduce
information imperfections and facilitate e±cient allocation decisions in the economy. For
example, consumer and producer price indices, indicators of aggregate economic activity
such as GDP and the unemployment rate are regularly published by government agencies in
almost all countries in the world. Rational agents are expected to use both public signals
and idiosyncratic information generated by their own experiences to form expectations
about the future and make their consumption and investment decisions. Do agents rely
more on their own private information or on public signals to inform themselves about
market conditions?
This paper takes advantage of a unique natural experiment in Ecuador to identify the
e®ects of the information provided by the government about prices (the published in°ation
statistics) on households' expectations about the evolution of future prices. The evidence
suggests that the public signal about prices plays an important causal role in the formation
of households' price expectations and the e®ect is heterogeneous. The public price signal
(published in°ation rate) has a stronger e®ect on the price expectations of older people,
better educated families and men.2 To the best of our knowledge, this is the ¯rst paper
in the literature to provide credible evidence on the causal e®ect of public information on
household expectations formation.
In an idealized Arrow-Debreau competitive economy, the equilibrium prices faced by the
agents in their market interactions are su±cient statistics: they aggregate all the dispersed
2The survey data available do not allow us to analyze the e®ects of public information on `in°ation
expectations'. The survey contains information regarding the direction of expected price change (Do you
think that prices will increase in next twelve months?). Our analysis thus focuses on `price expectations'
of households.
1information across the economy in an e±cient way. Thus, in such an environment, there
is no role for any public signal, especially relating to prices. In a more realistic setting,
the equilibrium prices faced by a household in any local market may not be su±cient
statistics because of lack of market integration (especially relevant in developing countries
with underdeveloped infrastructure) and also due to imperfect and asymmetric information.
Thus the price data published by a central statistical agency (the CPI and in°ation rate,
for example) can play a useful role in aggregating dispersed information in an economy
and help households and ¯rms better understand the prevailing market conditions. In an
economy with an incomplete set of markets, other non-price signals like the unemployment
rate and output gap can also a®ect expectations of economic agents as to the likely evolution
of prices in the economy; in the context of developing countries where the set of markets
is rather limited, such quantity signals might be especially important.
Recent theoretical analysis shows that the importance of public information (signals)
depends on the structure of interactions among agents (see, for example, Angeletos and
Pavan 2007 and 2008, Amador and Weill, 2008, and Morris and Shin, 2002). Since public
signals such as published statistics on economic activity or prices aggregate the dispersed
information across the economy and thus reveal information about the actions of others, it
is optimal for an individual agent (household) to put more weight on the public information
when actions of di®erent agents are strategic complements. Naturally, the importance of the
public signal is a positive function of the strength of complementarity. A growing theoretical
literature on the social value of public information shows that what is critical for welfare
analysis is the weight that agents put on public information relative to their idiosyncratic
private information. The related literature on social learning and herd behavior shows that
2when individual agents rely more on public signals and thus underutilize their idiosyncratic
information, this might create ine±cient herd behavior and also retard the process of social
learning (Banerjee, 1992, and Amador and Weill, 2007). There is, however, a long tradition
in development economics that emphasizes the potentially bene¯cial role of public signals
in escaping from low level equilibrium traps. When public signals are important in the
formation of expectations of economic agents, the government may be able to coordinate
expectations of private agents to attain Pareto-superior outcomes as emphasized in the
recent literature on poverty traps and economic development (see, for example, Murphy et
al., 1989, Rodriguez-Clare, 1996, Ray, 1998, Ho® and Stiglitz, 2001, and Bowles et. al.,
2006).3
The literature on in°ation expectations in developed countries is vast with many inter-
esting and insightful contributions. The focus of a large part of the literature has been on
relaxing the assumptions of the rational expectations model to better explain the dynam-
ics of in°ation observed in the data (see, for example, Sargent, 1993, MacCallum, 1992,
Pesaran, 1987). The related literature on the New Keynesian Phillips Curve has been an
active area of research with in°uential contributions (Gali and Gertler, 1999, Gali, Gertler,
and Lopez-Salido, 2005, Woodford, 2003, Roberts, 1997, Fuhrer and Moore, 1995). The
more recent literature on the sticky information (or rational inattentive agent) models of
in°ation expectations emphasizes the possibility that rational agents update their in°ation
expectations only periodically given the cost of acquiring price information (see, for exam-
3One can make an argument that the role of public information in developing countries is limited by
lack of education and paucity of information transmission channels. However, because developing countries
are also relatively \information poor," it is more likely that public information is not crowded out in the
competition for scarce \attention" of the economic agents (Falkinger, 2008).
3ple, Mankiw et al. 2003, 2006; Sims, 2003, Woodford, 2003, Branch, 2007; Carroll, 2003,
Klenow and Willis, 2007). In contrast to developed countries, the literature on the in°ation
expectations (more generally price expectations) of households in developing countries is
limited at best. Most of the existing literature on in°ation in developing countries use ag-
gregate macro models and aggregate data (see Jha, 2003, and Agenor and Montiel, 1999).
The focus of this paper is rather di®erent compared to the extant literature on in°ation
in both developed and developing countries.4 It addresses the following question: how
much does publicly provided price information a®ect the price expectations of the house-
holds? We provide some ¯rst credible evidence on the causal e®ect of public information
on household price expectations in the context of a developing country, Ecuador.5
We utilize a unique natural experiment in Ecuador to identify and estimate the relevance
of public information (the published in°ation rate) to households' expectations about future
prices. In March 2006, the National Bureau of Statistics of Ecuador (INEC) publicly
announced a mistake on its consumer price index and in°ation rate statistics. The mistake
4The literature on in°ation has used the public information on in°ation and unemployment to test two
things. First, as a test of rationality, the focus has been on the question if the forecast error in in°ation
is systematically related to the available public information. Second, it has been used to test if a simple
adaptive expectations model can ¯t the data well enough. The null hypothesis of adaptive expectations
imply that there should not be any additional information in the published in°ation and unemployment
rates. For an interesting recent analysis, see Mankiw et. al. (2003). They ¯nd that the forecast error
is systematically related to public information such as published in°ation and unemployment statistics.
They also ¯nd that the data reject a simple adaptive expectations model. Our focus is on the role of
public information in the formation of the in°ation expectations and thus we do not address the issue of
rationality.
5 To the best of our knowledge, there is no work that analyzes the e®ects of public signals on the
price expectations in developing countries. Even in developed countries, the literature on modeling the
actual in°ation expectations of households using survey data is rather limited, as emphasized recently by
Carroll (2003). Most of the work on in°ation dynamics uses either time series macro data or focuses on
explaining the central tendency in the household survey data utlizing the time variations for identi¯cation.
For example, the dependent variable in the extensive analysis in Mankiw et. al. (2003) is the median
in°ation expectations. Recent exceptions include Bryan and Venkatu (2001), Branch (2004, 2007) along
with Carroll (2003).
4was attributed to a programming error that started in January 2005 after a new software
was introduced. In April 2006, a revised series for the past 14 months was released. The
resulting adjustments were large. For instance, the o±cial annual in°ation rate in February
2006 dropped from 5.3 percent to 3.8 once the correction was made. This was an unexpected
event considering that the INEC had been successfully measuring prices for almost 40 years.
We use household survey data to analyze the e®ects of the exogenous change in the
published in°ation statistics arising from the programming error on household's survey
expectations regarding future prices. The data set is a monthly survey used by the Central
Bank of Ecuador to compute employment statistics and consumer con¯dence indexes in the
three largest urban areas of the country. The survey contains information on the households'
expectations about future prices as well as their individual characteristics (education, age,
gender and income). We model price expectations as a function of the public signal, private
information, and household's demographic characteristics. Probably the most important
di±culty in isolating the e®ects of public information is to ¯nd adequate controls for the
private information available to the households through the daily market interactions, for
example, at the groceries, gas stations, and department stores. In the absence of adequate
controls for the local information, public signals such as published in°ation statistics (even
if they are incorrect) will also re°ect the private information as the CPI would be correlated
with the local prices. We address this problem in three steps. First, we measure the public
signal as the part of incorrect in°ation which is due to the programming error (i.e., the gap
between the incorrect and true in°ation rates). Second, we use the true in°ation rate as
an additional control in the regressions. The actual CPI and in°ation rate during the 14
month period when INEC had been publishing the incorrect CPI was unobservable to the
5households. We use this unobserved city level in°ation rate as a control for the idiosyncratic
information set of the households in the di®erent cities in the data set. The unobserved
true in°ation rate would a®ect household price expectations only insofar as it is correlated
with the local price information. So it is likely to be an excellent control for the local prices
correlated with the public signal. Finally, in all of the speci¯cations, we employ city and
month ¯xed e®ects.
The central result from the empirical analysis is that the public signal about prices plays
an important role in the formation of household's price expectations. When the deviation
of the incorrect in°ation rate from the correct but unknown in°ation rate is larger, the
probability that a household expects the prices in the next twelve months to go up is also
higher, after controlling for the correctly measured in°ation rate, month and city ¯xed
e®ects and individual characteristics like gender, age, education, and income. The e®ects
of the public signal on household price expectations is heterogeneous.6 That is, the e®ects
are stronger for households headed by better educated and older people. There is also
evidence of a gender e®ect, the price expectations of men are more in°uenced by the public
signal compared to women. The estimated e®ects of public price signal are not small in
terms of the magnitudes; for example, a 3 percentage points increase in the public price
signal increases the number of households that think that the future prices would go up
by about 10 percent according to the estimates that ignore the heterogeneity in the e®ects
of the public information. The results from the more general speci¯cation that allows for
6The heterogeneity arises from di®erences in information sets. At any given period, a household would
acquire information on only a small subset of the relevant variables as information acquisition is costly and
depends on the availability of information channels. Even if information is available at no cost, di®erent
individuals are likely to have di®erent information sets because of bounded rationality considerations (Sims,
2006). The importance of public signals may thus depend on individual characteristics such as education,
age, gender and income.
6heterogeneity imply that a 3 percentage points increase in the public signal would increase
the probability that an individual expects prices to go up by about 0.14 if the individual
has 18 years of education, while the corresponding number for an uneducated individual is
only 0.047. The price expectations of young and uneducated women are not a®ected by
the public information.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1 provides brief background on
Ecuador and the workings of INEC, the country's central statistical agency, before explain-
ing details of the programming error in measuring the CPI from January 2005 to March
2006. The next section presents a conceptual framework and discusses our econometric
strategy. Sections (3) and (4) describe the data and present the empirical results, respec-
tively. Finally, the last section concludes with a summary of the ¯ndings.
(1) Measuring Prices in Ecuador
(1.1) Country Background
Ecuador is a developing country in South America. In 2006, its per capita GDP was
close to $3,200, lower than most of the other countries in this continent except Bolivia and
Paraguay. Ecuador's economy relies heavily on the oil industry. Oil exports accounted for
about 55 percent of its total exports and more than 25 percent of the Central Government
revenue came from oil-related royalties in 2006.
Ecuador su®ered a severe ¯nancial crisis at the end of 1999 that precipitated a collapse
of the banking system and a contraction of more than 6 percent in GDP. By December
1999, the national currency (sucre) had depreciated 195 percent over the past year and
in°ation rate accelerated from an annual rate of 27 percent in January 1998 to 78 percent
7in January 2000. In January, 2000, a presidential decree approved a series of structural
reforms to address the ongoing crisis including the adoption of the US dollar as the legal
currency of the country (i.e., `dollarization' in popular parlance). A slow economic recovery
followed. Higher oil prices and increased remittances helped the country achieve an average
annual growth rate close to 5 percent from 2001 to 2006. In addition, in°ation drastically
decreased from a peak of 108 percent in September 2000 to 16 percent in January 2002 and
less than 2 percent by the end of 2004. Figure 1 shows the steady decline in in°ation rates
until the end of 2004; from this point on, in°ation rates seemed to stabilize at around 4
percent.
(1.2) The Ecuadorian National Institute of Statistics: Methods and Credi-
bility
Soon after its creation in 1976, the Ecuadorian National Institute of Statistics (INEC)
started to compute Consumer Price Index (CPI) data on monthly basis. In the ¯rst work-
day of each month, the institute generally releases CPI data of the previous month. The
INEC provides the o±cial in°ation estimate that is used for all legal matters in the country.
Consistent with international practice, the CPI is computed as a weighted average of the
prices of a representative basket of goods and services. The basket, weights, and base year
are determined using information from the most recent income-and-expenditure survey.7
The INEC's director is appointed by the President. The lack of independence from the
executive power may compromise the credibility of its statistics. However, manipulation of
price statistics by INEC for political purpose has not been a serious concern in Ecuador.
7Income-and-Expenditure surveys are carried out by the INEC. The latest surveys were performed in
1975 (July 1975 { June 1976), 1994 (September 1994 { August 1995), and 2003 (February 2003 { January
2004).
8The INEC follows a strict methodology to construct the CPI which limits the institute's
ability to modify its estimates to suit political goals.8 Its CPI and in°ation estimates
are deemed credible enough to be used by several international organizations such as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank in their o±cial statistics.
(1.3) The Natural Experiment: INEC's \Mistake"
Until December 2004, INEC constructed the CPI using a basket of approximately
195 goods and services that was determined using an income-and-expenditure survey from
September 1994 to August 1995. From February 2003 to January 2004, a new survey
was implemented and a basket of 299 goods and services was selected.9 The INEC used
this new basket to change the base year of the CPI and, starting in January 2005, its
computation was based on this new basket (INEC, 2005). In March 19, 2006, the INEC
publicly announced a mistake that a®ected the CPI indices published over the previous 14
months.10 The revised CPI statistics for the 14 month period were published in April 5,
2006, and the resulting adjustments were large. For instance, as shown in Figures 2 and 3,
the national annual in°ation rate in February 2006 dropped from 5.3 percent to 3.8 percent
once the correction was made.
We are not aware of any formal government publication that documents the details
of this event except for a footnote in a statistical report published by the Central Bank of
Ecuador (see Banco Central del Ecuador 2006, Table 4.1.1a, Footnote 1). To understand
8Other type of government statistics (such as GDP growth) may be more vulnerable to \adjustments"
due to political pressure by the government and thus likely to be less credible.
9The new basket includes several items that households consumed in 2004 but were not available in
1994; these include cellular phones, DVD players, and personal computers, for example (INEC 2005).
10On March 19 2006, the INEC made a press release acknowledging a mistake in its CPI statistics (See,
for example, El Comercio, pg 12, March 19, 2006, Expreso, pg. 8 March, 20, 2006, and El Universo, pg.
A.10, March 21, 2006). Revised series were announced on April 5, 2006 (El Universo, pg A.2, April 6,
2006).
9the nature of the INEC's mistake, we interviewed several sta® members of the INEC, the
Central Bank of Ecuador, and other government agencies and examined internal reports
and presentations. The mistake was attributed to an error in the programming code (a bug)
in the software that the INEC used to compute the CPI. Essentially, the error overestimated
the price of housing and underestimated the prices of food-and-beverages. Other products
were una®ected.11 The adjustments in housing prices are particularly large. To estimate
the housing CPI the INEC measures the rents of a sample of rental units in urban areas.
Rental units in the sample are visited twice a year (once every six months). That is,
about one sixth of the units in the sample are visited each month, the gross rent paid by
the tenants is recorded, and a six-month rental change is estimated. After the base year
was changed, INEC's software incorrectly imputed this six-month change as a one-month
change. Such error can introduce large upward biases in the CPI statistics. For instance,
if rental prices grow by 6 percent a year, the INEC's (incorrect) estimates would predict
an annual 40 percent increase.
To measure prices of food-and-beverages, the INEC collects information on prices of a
large number of fruits, vegetables, cereals, and beverages. Most of these data are gathered
twice a month (once every two-weeks). After the data are collected, a two-week price
change is computed. INEC's software incorrectly imputed this two-week price change as a
one-month change introducing a negative bias in the CPI statistics.
Until July 2005 the downward bias in the prices of food-and-beverages were larger than
the positive bias in the rental price. Thus, from January to July 2005, the \true" CPI was
11The INEC's press release on March 19 2006 brie°y described the error in the housing component of the
CPI. When the revised series where released, the mismeasurement of both food and housing components
where acknowledged (see for example, El Universo, pg. A.2, April 6, 2006, Expreso, pg. 7, April 6, 2006,
and Dinero, Diario de Negocios, pg. 1, April 6, 2006).
10higher than the one that was originally reported. From July 2005 until February 2006, on
the other hand, the positive biases were larger. The mistake in the INEC's CPI software
was an unexpected event. More importantly, the adjustments made to the CPI (due to the
nature of the error) and the time when the mistake was discovered are plausible exogenous
events to any individual or household in the economy. We use these exogenous changes in
the published CPI series to analyze the relationship between the household's expectations
about future prices and the information provided by the government (the public signal).
The next section discusses the econometric strategy in more detail and also lays out a
simple conceptual framework to guide the empirical analysis.
(2) Conceptual Framework and Econometric Strategy
(2.1) Conceptual Framework
The expectation of an individual or a household i regarding an economic variable in
period t + 1 (denoted as Xt+1) is formed using the information available at the current
period t: The expectation formation can be described as follows:





where the expectation regarding period t + 1 is formed at period t utilizing two sources








information sets; and Zi and ²i
are observable and unobservable individual or household characteristics respectively that
may a®ect expectations formation.12 The vector Z includes characteristics of households
12In an early analysis of in°ation in Sweden, Jonung (1981) shows that public's expected in°ation depends
on their perception about the past in°ation. The perception is formed using \two sets of data: (a) the
public's recollection of price indices, collected and published primarily by government agencies, and (b)
11such as education and age, while ² is a scalar that captures the idiosyncratic unobserved
di®erences across households. The public information set consists of primarily the statistics
published by government statistical agencies. In addition, professional in°ation forecasts
and independent media reports might be relevant, but they are rare in a developing country
.13 As discussed before, the typical elements in the private information set are prices faced
in the daily market interactions, and also price information learnt from family, friends
and neighbors. Assuming that the expectation function can be approximated by a linear
conditional expectation function, we have the following speci¯cation (to simplify notation,
assume that the information sets are singletons):




= °0 + °1­p(t) + °2­i(t) + Z
0
i¦ + ²i: (2)
Here °1 measures the relevance of the public signal and its relevance depends primarily
on the precision (information content) of the public information relative to the private
information (Amador and Weill, 2008).
The model in equation (2) is, however, restrictive in that it imposes a homogeneity
restriction on the conditional response of agents to public information. We introduce
heterogeneity in the e®ects of public information by including its interaction with the
household head's characteristics like age, education and gender and also household income.
the individual's own experience of surveying prices and purchasing goods and services" (P. 962).
13Carroll (2003) develops and estimates an in°ation expectations formation model using data from USA
where the general public adopt the professionals' forecasts with a certain probability rather than trying to
form their own rational forecast.
12The general model of expectation can thus be written as follows:







i¦ + ²i; (3)
where Hi µ Zi is a vector of relevant characteristics of agent i such as age, gender,
and education that might in°uence the impact of the public signal. A better educated
individual is expected to be more responsive to the public signals because of better access
to information channels and improved cognitive ability, among other things. Age might play
a role as older people may be more budget-conscious and worry about prices more given a
°at or declining earnings pro¯le. They might also respond more to the public signal as the
demands on their attention might be less when they are not active in the labor market.
The gender di®erence in the e®ect of public signal may be due to di®erences in exposure
to the media and di®erential in the precision of private information sets. Women usually
do the daily shopping at the groceries and department stores, and thus are likely to have
more market interactions than men. This means that the women will tend to have more
precise information about the price trends in their own neighborhood and may rely more
on the private information set when forming price expectations. The household income
might determine the information channels available (such as television and radio) and thus
a®ect the likelihood that the public signal reaches a given household.14
14The data set does not contain information on ownership of television and radio. However, we believe
that household income and education are reliable controls for such heterogeneity in information channels.
Also, note that it is unlikely that the ownership of television and radio would change signi¯cantly in a
period of 14 months.
13(2.2) Econometric Strategy
The source of the error in the INEC's estimates of CPI and in°ation rate over the 14
month period is a random mistake in the computer software used to calculate the CPI. We
use this \natural experiment" as the source of exogenous variations to identify the e®ects
of public information about prices on the price expectations of households. One may,
however, plausibly argue that the incorrect in°ation rate or CPI is a deterministic function
of the components of the true CPI, and thus it is correlated with the actual prices faced by
the households in their daily market interactions. This means that in itself the incorrect
in°ation rate cannot identify the causal e®ects of the public signal as it may capture at
least part of the private information set. To address this concern, we use a three pronged
strategy. First, we measure the public signal as the part of incorrect in°ation which is due
to the programming error (i.e., the gap between the incorrect and true in°ation rates).15
Second, we add the true in°ation rate (published in April 2006) in the city of residence
of a household as an additional control in our empirical models. As discussed before, the
\true" in°ation rate was unobservable to households during the 14 month period when
INEC had been publishing incorrect estimates and, it is plausible that this true in°ation
is correlated with the prices faced by the households in their daily market interactions.
Thus, the true but unobserved in°ation rate can be used as a control for the idiosyncratic
price information of the households in the di®erent cities in the data set. We emphasize
here again that the true in°ation rate is likely to be a good control for identi¯cation of
the e®ect of public signal as it captures any private information that might be correlated
15We believe that the in°ation rate rather than the CPI is the relevant public signal for forming ex-
pectations regarding future prices. The public release of price statistics and media reports concentrate
mostly on the in°ation rate and thus the households price perceptions are likely to respond to the published
in°ation rates.
14with the public signal, i.e., the di®erence between the incorrect and correct in°ation rates.
If the true in°ation rate is not correlated with the private information, it should have no
impact on household's expectations, as it was not observed at that time. Third, all of the
empirical models in this paper include city and month ¯xed e®ects. The city ¯xed e®ects
control for the di®erential but time invariant component of the idiosyncratic information
set available to the households in a given city, while the month ¯xed e®ects sweep o®
the e®ects of any macroeconomic news common to the cities which might in°uence the
expectations of the households. One can also appeal to the voluminous literature on Phillips
curve to argue that a household's price expectations and the labor market conditions are
closely related. For identi¯cation of the e®ects of public price signal on household price
expectations, we thus need to control for public signals on the labor market conditions, in
particular the unemployment rate. To alleviate such concerns, we include city level monthly
unemployment rate as an additional control in the regressions. The upshot of the above
discussion is that conditional on the true in°ation rate, city and month ¯xed e®ects and
city level unemployment rate, the di®erence between the incorrect and the true in°ation
rates can be treated as a valid natural experiment for identi¯cation of the e®ects of public
information on the price expectations of the households. If the public price signal does not
matter, then the mistake itself should not a®ect household's expectations after controlling
for the factors mentioned above.
To test this hypothesis, we use a simple empirical model based on equation (3) above.
As is common with the survey data on price expectations, our data set from three cities in
Ecuador provides us information about the direction of price expectations. More precisely,
the survey allows us to use a binary variable which takes on the value of 1 when a household
15thinks that the prices will go up in the next twelve months. Given the binary nature of the
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where Pic(t+1) is a binary price expectation variable that takes on a value of 1 if the house-
hold i in city c surveyed in month t expects that the prices will go up in next twelve months,
~ Pic(t) is the gap between the incorrect and correct in°ation rate available to the household
at period t, ^ Pic(t) is the true in°ation rate, Zi is a vector of household characteristics, and
Hi µ Zi is the subset of household characteristics that might in°uence the strength of the
public signal's impact. Our focus is on the identi¯cation and estimation of the parameters
¯1 and ¨: The model in equation (4) above is parsimonious in the sense that the public
and private information sets include only the latest information available at period t on the
relevant variables: In a general model, additional information from the past periods may
be relevant in forming the household price expectations. For example, in addition to the
most recent published in°ation rate, the magnitude of the change in in°ation rate between
the last two periods may be important for the determination of expectations.17 In the
empirical analysis, we explore this possibility and check the robustness of the conclusions
reached on the basis of the parsimonious speci¯cation in equation (4) above.
16In the empirical implementation, we also report results from linear probability model and logit model
in an appendix.
17It is reasonable to assume that people pay more attention to the in°ation rate when there is a relatively
large change from one period to the next. Given the sample size, it is not possible to estimate a more
general dynamic model.
16(3) The Data and Variables
To estimate equation (4) we use data from a monthly survey that has been used by
the Central Bank of Ecuador to produce consumer con¯dence indices and unemployment
statistics.18 The survey was ¯nanced by the Central Bank of Ecuador and carried out by
the Facultad de Ciencias Sociales FLACSO-Ecuador, a leading university in the country.
It is representative of the population of Quito, Guayaquil, and Cuenca, Ecuador's three
largest urban centers.
The sample consists of a rotating panel of more than 3,000 households (dwellings).
Each month, about 2,300 of these households are interviewed, and information about em-
ployment, earnings, and basic demographic characteristics (such as education and marital
status, for example) for each member of the family is collected. In addition, the respondent
is asked twenty questions about her well being and her perceptions about the economic
prospects of the country. The following question regarding price expectations forms the
basis of our analysis: \Within the next 12 months, do you think that prices will increase,
decrease, or stay the same?" As noted earlier, we create a dummy variable which equals
one when a household response to the above question is that they think the prices will
increase in the next twelve months.
The survey data have been matched with in°ation estimates from the INEC which vary
by city and month. Both the incorrect and the revised estimates of in°ation have been
recorded. Since at the time they are surveyed respondents are only aware of the past month
in°ation estimates, the pricing data correspond to the annual in°ation rate of the previous
18The employment survey is used to compute a Consumer Con¯dence Index (see, for example, Banco
Central del Ecuador 2007) and unemployment statistics (see, for example, Banco Central del Ecuador 2006,
Table 4.1.7).
17month when the survey was made. For example, those households surveyed in March 2006
have been matched with in°ation data of February 2006. In addition, the data set provides
information about the head of the household's demographic characteristics such as gender,
education, age, marital status, income, and number of children. A list and de¯nition of
the variables are presented in Table 1. To estimate equation (4), we use survey data from
April 2005 to March 2006, the period when the \wrong" public signal was released.19
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 2. The incorrect average annual in°ation rate
in Quito, Guayaquil and Cuenca published in March 2006 was close to 4.7 percent and
dropped to 3.1 percent once the error was found.20 The average size of the adjustment
was smaller in the previous 11 months decreasing from an average incorrect estimate of
2.4 to 2.0 percent. As shown in Figure 4, there is substantial variation in both correct
and incorrect in°ation estimates in each of these cities. The typical household was headed
by a 47 year old male with 9 years of education. Household income averages about $330
per month although income distribution is clearly skewed to the right with a handful of
households earning more than $5,000 per month.
(4) Empirical Results
Public Signal and Household Expectations About Price Changes
Table 3 reports the estimation results from probit model (marginal e®ects evaluated at
the sample means) based on equation (4) above. We report estimates from a number of
alternative speci¯cations. The ¯rst column of this table reports the simplest speci¯cation,
19INEC's mistake started in January 2005. Unfortunately, we only have survey data from April 2005.
20Notice that in°ation rate estimates published in March 2006 refer to the in°ation of February 2006.
These numbers do not exactly match those displayed in Figure 3 because they only refer to the three cities
covered in the survey.
18and then progressively, we expand the set of controls. The results and conclusions of this
paper are robust if we employ linear probability and logit models instead of the probit
model. For the sake of brevity, we discuss the results only from the probit model in the
text and report the results from linear probability and logit models in an appendix. For all
of the di®erent speci¯cations reported in Table 3, we use survey data from April 2005 until
March 2006, the period during which both the incorrect and the revised in°ation data are
available.
If the public signal matters, then the mistake itself (i.e., incorrect in°ation - correct





would be expected (i.e., ^ ¯1 > 0). Speci¯cations (1) to (4) in Table 3 present
robust evidence in favor of an important e®ect of public signal on households' price expec-
tations. Across all the di®erent speci¯cations, the estimates show a consistently positive




: The magnitude of the coe±cient seems robust,
even after controlling for the \true" in°ation rate, unemployment rate, household's demo-
graphic characteristics, and month and city ¯xed e®ects. The estimated e®ect of the public
signal is statistically signi¯cant at 1 percent level across speci¯cations 1-4 according to
the robust standard errors reported in parentheses below the coe±cient. However, when
we take into account possible cluster correlations at the city-month level in addition to
heteroskedasticity, the standard errors become larger which is consistent with a priori ex-
pectations (reported in brackets under the coe±cient and referred to as \clustered standard
errors" henceforth). It is reassuring that the estimated e®ects of the public signal in the
more general speci¯cations 3-4 remain signi¯cant at 5 percent level even after correcting
19for possible cluster correlations.21 The estimated e®ects of public signal are not small.
For instance, using the speci¯cation in column 4, our estimates imply that an \incorrect"
INEC estimate that overpredicts the true in°ation rate by 3 percentage points increases
the share of households that expect prices to increase by about 10 percent. 22 As discussed
before, the relevance of the public signal depends primarily on its precision (information
content) relative to that of the private signals (Amador and Weill, 2008). Thus, our results
suggest that, even in a developing country like Ecuador, an institute such as the INEC
that enjoys a measure of credibility (see the discussion in section 1.2) can provide valuable
public information and help aggregate dispersed information across di®erent regions.23
An interesting ¯nding from Table 3 is that the true in°ation rate has a statistically
signi¯cant (at 1 percent level according to the clustered standard errors) e®ect with a
numerical magnitude of the same order as that of public signal. This is consistent with
the argument that the unobserved true in°ation rate is a good control for the correlated
private information of the households. Also, consistent with the available evidence, the
unemployment rate has a negative correlation with the price expectations of the households
21Since we include the city ¯xed e®ects in the estimation, it sweeps o® any time invariant source of intra-
city correlations among the households. We also employ month ¯xed e®ects and thus serial correlation in
in°ation is not likely to be a problem. We thank Steve Pischke for pointing this out to us.
Also, if we use aggregate data at the city level to estimate the basic model, the central conclusion
that the public signal has a statistically signi¯cant and economically important impact on household price
expectations remain intact. Note that the city level aggregation cannot be used when we relax the restrictive
assumption of no heterogeneity in the e®ects of public signal.
22So the percentage of people expecting an increase in future prices goes up from about 79 percent to 89
percent.
23Ecuador faced periods of high in°ation in the past and, thus, price trends are a topic of general concern.
This might lead one to think that our results are relevant only for the countries where in°ation had been
a problem historically. We, however, believe that the results are of more general interest. In fact, one can
argue that the role of periodically published price information (like monthly in°ation rate) has little value
in a high in°ation environment. In an environment of rapidly rising prices, households would rely more on
private information generated by their daily market interactions. Thus, periodically published public price
signals in°uence household price expectations more in a relatively stable in°ation regime as has been the
case in Ecuador in recent years.
20although it is not statistically signi¯cant.
In addition, the results suggest that the future price expectations depend on the demo-
graphic characteristics of the household. For example, estimates displayed in column (4),
Table 3, show that a household that is headed by a male is about 1.5 percentage points more
likely to think that prices will increase than a household headed by a female.24 Moreover,
the older the age of the head of the household, the higher is the probability that he or she
expects future prices to increase, and households with higher income expect lower prices.25
The last column of Table 3 introduces the general speci¯cation as in equation (4) that
allows for heterogeneity in the e®ects of public information. This heterogeneity is mod-
eled by including interaction terms between the public signal and the household head's
characteristics (age, education and gender) and log household income. The results provide
evidence that the e®ects of public price information are heterogeneous, they vary substan-
tially with the household characteristics. The results suggest that the public signal has a
substantially stronger e®ect among those who are more educated. The age of the household
head also has a positive e®ect on the impact of the public signal, although the numerical
magnitude of this e®ect is relatively small and it is also less precisely estimated (signi¯cant
at 10 percent). The estimates also indicate a numerically important gender di®erence in the
e®ects of public signal and it is statistically signi¯cant if one relies on the robust standard
error. However, according to the clustered standard error, the estimated gender di®erence
is not statistically signi¯cant.26 After controlling for the household characteristics through
24This is in contrast to the available evidence in the context of USA that the women usually predict
higher in°ation rates (see, for example, Bryan and Venkatu, 2001).
25This is consistent with the evidence on developed countries (see, for example, Bryan and Venkatu,
2001).
26One can make an argument that when estimating the interaction e®ects there is no a priori reasons to
expect cluster correlations that arise from the fact that the variations in the in°ation is at the city-month
21appropriate interaction e®ects, we do not ¯nd any evidence that the household income
matters for the impact of the public signal. The estimated coe±cient on the public signal
itself (the di®erence between the incorrect and correct in°ation) becomes much smaller and
statistically insigni¯cant when the interaction e®ects are included. This implies that the
e®ect of public price information is negligible for uneducated, young women. The evidence
(although imprecise) that public signal has a weaker e®ect on price expectations of women
is consistent with the hypothesis that the women tend to acquire more precise information
about local price trends as they do most of the shopping for a typical household. To have
a better sense of the magnitude of the interaction e®ects, consider a scenario where the
government incorrectly overstates the in°ation rate by 3 percentage points. In this case, the
probability that a respondent thinks that prices will increase goes up by 0.14 when he/she
has 18 years of education. The corresponding number for an uneducated respondent is only
0.047. In terms of gender di®erences, the estimates imply that the impact of a 3 percentage
points increase in the published in°ation on the probability that a person expects prices to
be higher is 0.11 and 0.06 for an average male and female, respectively. Uneducated young
women, on the other hand, do not systematically change their opinions about future prices
when the public signal changes.
Robustness Checks
As discussed before, an important part of our identi¯cation strategy for the results
in Table 3 is that we use \true" in°ation estimates (city level) to control for the actual
level. The data variations used for identifying the interaction e®ects are at the household level, even though
the in°ation rate varies only at the city-month level. In this sense, the robust standard errors reported in
parenthesis may not be entirely misleading for speci¯cation 5 in Table 3. We thank Je®rey Wooldridge
for clari¯cations on this point.
22prices that households face in their daily interactions. While we believe that this is an
eminently sensible choice, there are other plausible alternatives. For example, one can
argue that households care more about the prices of those products that they buy more
often (such as food and energy) and less about other products that, nonetheless, are part
of the CPI. If this is the case, the prices that households face in their market interactions
could be better approximated by prices of food-related products. One can also argue that
the unobserved true in°ation (both for over-all CPI and Food CPI) for a single period may
not capture all the relevant correlated private information. To address this we include the
change in true in°ation between the two most recent periods in addition to the most recent
true in°ation rate as controls for correlated private information: We explore these di®erent
possibilities in Tables 4a and 4b. The results in Table 4a use the speci¯cation without the
interaction e®ects (corresponding to column 4 in Table 3) and those in Table 4b use the
general speci¯cation including the interaction e®ects (corresponding to column 5 in Table
3).
First, consider the results reported in Table 4a. The ¯rst column shows our baseline
results that correspond to those displayed in the fourth column of Table 3. To control for the
prices faced by households, in the second column, we use the true but unobserved in°ation
rate of the food-and-beverage CPI group as a control for correlated private information.
The coe±cient of public signal is very similar to that in column 1 and remains statistically
signi¯cant at 5 percent level. The third column adds the change in the true food CPI
between the two recent periods to the speci¯cation in column 2: The fourth column reports
the results when we add the change in correct in°ation over the two recent periods along
with the correct in°ation rate (based on the over-all CPI). The evidence in the columns
233-4 of Table 4a clearly shows that the strong e®ect of the public signal on households' price
expectations is robust to these alternative speci¯cations.
In the speci¯cations discussed so far (Table 3 and ¯rst four columns of Table 4a), we use
the di®erence between the incorrect and correct in°ation rates as the relevant public signal
available in period t. One might worry that by focusing on a single period's public informa-
tion, we are potentially underestimating the e®ect of the public signal. The households are
likely to take into account public information from more than just the recent past period.
To address this issue, the last two columns in table 4a reports the estimated e®ect of the
public price signal when we include the change in the public signal over the two most recent
periods along with the public signal (in level) at period t in alternative speci¯cations. The
magnitude of change in the public signal would be important in expectation formation if
households learn over time and also pay attention to the public signal more when there is
a large change from one period to the next. The results are consistent with the conclusion
that the public signal has a signi¯cant e®ect on the formation of price expectations of the
households. Consider, for example, the most general speci¯cation in column 6. The coe±-
cient of public signal at period t is smaller and less precisely estimated in this speci¯cation,
but the change in public signal over the recent two periods has a coe±cient similar to that
of public signal at t in column 4 of table 4a and it is signi¯cant at 10 percent according to
the clustered standard error (at 1 percent if we rely on robust standard errors).
Table 4b shows evidence on the heterogeneity in the e®ects of the public signal using the
alternative controls for private information set discussed above and also di®erent measures
of the public signal. The estimated interaction e®ects are robust and consistent with the
results reported earlier in Table 3 and discussed in the preceding subsection.
24(5) Conclusions
This paper provides credible evidence that public price signals can have a signi¯cant
e®ect on household's price expectations in developing countries, and that this e®ect is
heterogeneous. To estimate the e®ect of the public signal on households' price expectations,
we exploit a natural experiment in Ecuador where, due to an error in the software used to
compute the CPI, the published in°ation rate from January 2005 to March 2006 deviated
signi¯cantly from the true in°ation rate. We can exploit the variations produced by the
software error, and the consequent release of the revised in°ation series to identify the
causal e®ect of the public signal (published in°ation rate) on the price expectations of the
households.
The empirical analysis uses household survey data from the three largest cities in
Ecuador. We analyze the relationship between a household's price expectations and the
public signal de¯ned as that part of the observed in°ation which is due to the program-
ming error (i.e., the di®erence between the incorrect and true in°ation). Our results show
that, even after controlling for the true but unobserved in°ation rate, household's charac-
teristics and month and city ¯xed e®ects, the public signal (INEC's programming error)
has a statistically signi¯cant and numerically important e®ect on price expectations of the
households. Moreover, the e®ect of the public signal is heterogeneous and depends on the
characteristics of the household head. The impact of the public signal is more pronounced
among more educated individuals, older people and men. The price expectations of young
and uneducated women are not systematically in°uenced by the public information.
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